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Abstract 
This article brings a fresh perspective to the causal mechanism 
of coalition-building among diasporas pursuing genocide recognition, 
particularly horizontal alliances between the Armenian, Assyrian, 
and Kurdish diasporas. Why, how, and how durably do diasporas 
build coalitions to address past atrocities? Building coalitions for 
genocide recognition requires three important factors: a common 
adversary, a host-land, conducive to proliferation of transitional 
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justice claims, and a single contentious issue on which diasporas can 
focus. Coalitions based on common experiences of victimhood and 
identity can elicit long-term cooperation and high-level involvement, 
as among Armenians and Assyrians. Coalitions primarily based on 
strategic interests to pressure a common adversary, without common 
experience, show less organizational involvement, as among 
Armenians and Kurds. The article discusses diaspora mobilizations 
around the 2015 Armenian genocide centennial and Turkey’s EU 
accession with a wider sociospatial perspective of political processes 
related to Armenia, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. 
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Introduction 
Transitional justice research has grown exponentially in the 
twenty-first century as civil wars multiply, leaving ethnic and other 
identity-based groups displaced, and searching for redress of 
suffering. Theoretical and policy debates have traditionally focused 
on whether to prosecute or pardon perpetrators, apply retributive or 
restorative justice, or mobilize through top-down or bottom-up 
activism (Kim 2014). Recent scholarship has shifted from this need to 
address perpetrators or victims in postconflict societies (Roht-Arriaza 
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and Mariezcurrena 2006; Barkan and Karn 2006; McEvoy and 
McGregor 2008; Subotic 2009; Weibelhaus-Brahm 2010; Snyder and 
Vinjamuri 2003/2004; Kim 2014; Waller 2016; Hughes and 
Kostovicova 2018). More recent works seek “holistic,” and 
“comprehensive” approaches, integrating aspects of transitional 
justice (Kim 2014:36) through timing and sequencing (Kovras 2017). 
The role of conflict-generated diasporas, many from forced 
displacement, has been almost absent.  
In the Introduction to this special issue (Koinova and 
Karabegovic 2019), recent scholarship is featured as addressing 
global aspects of transitional justice, highlighting diaspora 
participation in truth commissions, legal tribunals, memorialization, 
and invocation of universal jurisdiction toward past crimes (Roht-
Arriaza 2006; Young and Park 2009; Hoogenboom and Quinn 2011; 
Duthie 2011; Haider 2014; Koinova 2016; Karabegovic 2017; Orjuela 
2017). How diasporas build coalitions with different agents has not 
been addressed. Studying coalition-building is important, as 
diasporas affect political processes in original homelands not simply 
on their own, but by drawing support from other agents in host-
lands and other locations. This article puts forward a discussion 
about coalition-building for transitional justice in global diaspora 
politics, specifically genocide recognition. It shows the importance of 
coalitions built horizontally among diasporas as actors of similar 
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power, contributing to diaspora studies and transitional justice 
scholarship. 
Why, how, and how durably do diasporas build coalitions with 
other agents to address grievances related to past atrocities? Why are 
certain coalitions more durable than others? I argue that value-based 
rationales might provide legitimacy for activism, yet the actual 
pursuit of transitional justice claims is subject to strategic and tactical 
calculations. Building coalitions for genocide recognition requires 
three important factors: a common adversary, a host-land context 
conducive to human rights and transitional justice claims, and a 
specific issue to focus on from abroad. Coalitions based on common 
experiences of victimhood and identities can elicit long-term 
cooperation and high-level involvement; those based on strategic 
interests to pressure a shared adversary, without common 
victimhood experience or identities, have less involvement.  
This article offers empirical examples from coalitions built by 
the Armenian diaspora with other persecuted groups. Based on 
common Christian identities and experiences of gross human rights 
violations during the collapsing Ottoman Empire in the early 
twentieth century, Armenian and Assyrian diaspora built sustainable 
coalitions with high involvement. By contrast, Armenians and Kurds 
built loose coalitions with low involvement, seeking primarily to 
pressure Turkey, as evidenced in the 2000s and early 2010s when 
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opportunities to join the EU opened. 
I review scholarship on diasporas and genocide politics and 
the causal mechanism of coalition-building from a social movements 
perspective. Against the backdrop of a well-developed literature on 
the Armenian diaspora, I present a fresh perspective about 
horizontal coalition-building with other persecuted groups—
Assyrians and Kurds. I conclude with implications for the study of 
coalition-building for genocide recognition and transitional justice 
research. 
 
Diaspora mobilizations for genocide recognition 
I use “diaspora” in line with Adamson and Demetriou’s 
definition emphasizing connectivities: “a social collectivity that exists 
across state borders and that has succeeded over time to: 1) sustain a 
collective national, cultural, or religious identity through a sense of 
internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined 
homeland and 2) display an ability to address the collective interests 
of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal 
organizational framework and transnational links” (2007:497). 
Diaspora entrepreneurs are formal leaders within migrant 
organizations, or informal leaders organizing through restaurants, 
businesses, or social activities (Koinova 2016). Diaspora mobilization 
designates pursuit of claims and practices related to original 
  6 
homelands through various trajectories—institutional or activist 
channels—and moderate (“contained”) or more radical 
(“transgressive”) means or combinations thereof.  
As Waller argues, genocide research has witnessed an 
“explosion of interest” in recent years. Three journals—Genocide 
Studies and Prevention, Journal of Genocide Studies, and Genocide Studies 
International—alongside the Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies 
brought more comparative perspectives (2016:xxiii). The field grew 
because of ethnic cleansing and genocide during the wars in former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the formation of ad hoc international 
and “hybrid” tribunals, and the International Criminal Court, among 
others (Bloxham and Moses 2010). Nevertheless, atrocities such as 
the Holocaust and Armenian and Rwandan genocides remain part of 
public discourses; others, such as those committed on Assyrians or 
Iraqi Kurds, remain little known (Lemarchand 2011).  
Diaspora mobilization remains marginal in mainstream 
genocide research, even if forced displacement of Jewish and 
Armenian diasporas has been foundational to the field of diaspora 
studies (Cohen 1999; Tölölyan 2000; Shain 2002; Sheffer 2003; 
Vertovec 2004). Even with the Convention on Genocide,i “genocide” 
remains “ubiquitous,” invoked “rhetorically” (Bloxham and Moses 
2010:1), and bringing various meanings. Theorizing about diaspora 
mobilizations for genocide recognition is scattered. Diaspora 
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institutions can link current threats with past traumas (Shain 2002). 
Some build bridges with local actors to foster remembrance, as for 
the 1995 Srebrenica genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Karabegovic 
2017). Where a contentious traumatic issue remains unresolved 
between diaspora and host-land, victim-based approaches proliferate 
in claim-making even during postconflict reconstruction (Koinova 
2016).  
Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Ukrainian diasporas, 
related to the post-Soviet space, have also invoked claims about 
genocide recognition. A “Soviet genocide narrative” developed in 
Western countries to discuss who was tortured, murdered, and 
deported during the Stalinist era (Budryte 2013:172). Diaspora 
Ukrainians were instrumental in developing a narrative of the 
famine “Holodomor” as genocide (Nikolko 2017). Rwandan and 
Tamil diasporas appropriated and strategized around norms and 
practices of transitional justice, “presencing a violent past” (Orjuela 
2017). The UK-based Tamil diaspora framed the violence associated 
with ending the intrastate warfare with 2009 massive killings of 
Tamils in Sri Lanka as “genocide” (Walton 2015; Godwin 2017). 
Diaspora Kurds sought to recognize as genocide the chemical attacks 
on Iraqi Kurds during the rule of Saddam Hussein, known as Anfal 
(Baser and Toivanen 2017).  
These works consider identity- and interest-based rationales 
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for diaspora engagement, but not coalition-building between diaspora 
groups, a central contribution here. I study mobilizations of the 
Armenian, Assyrian, and Kurdish diasporas for genocide recognition 
from the perspective of relations between them. These diasporas 
have different histories with somewhat intersecting current agendas. 
The durable alliance between Armenians and Assyrians is primarily 
based on demands for genocide recognition. Between Armenians 
and Kurds, the alliance further relates to Kurdish participation in the 
Armenian genocide, common experiences with more recent violence 
in Turkey, and fear of further killings. The desire of Iraqi Kurds to 
have the Anfal massacres recognized as genocide is a persistent 
verbal gesture more than a movement.2 I discuss these shortly. 
 
Coalition-building as a causal mechanism 
Social movement theory has been at the forefront of studying 
coalition-building as causal mechanism characteristic for bottom-up 
mobilizations in domestic and global politics. Coalitions entail 
cooperation among actors in conscious, rational, interest-based ways, 
acting together for joint actions, with broadly defined objectives “to 
attract the widest array of adherents” (Smith and Bandy 2005:10). 
Fox (2002) places coalitions between networks and movements. 
Networks are informal with relatively few organizational ties; 
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movements integrate ties at the highest level; coalitions are more 
formal, often linking networks into movements (352). As Smith and 
Bandy note, alliances of social change often begin as short-term 
endeavors, but facilitate resources to tackle long-term problems (3-4). 
Transnational coalitions become common with the emergence of 
global issues concerning different populations: capitalism and labor, 
war and peace, environmental degradation and climate change 
(McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 2005; Smith and Bandy 2005; Della 
Porta and Tarrow 2005; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Apart 
from noting diasporas as “rooted cosmopolitans,” inside and outside 
their societies (Tarrow 2005), this literature has not yet addressed 
coalition-building. 
Social movement scholarship has considered why groups join 
coalitions. Political threats, classically considered inspiring for 
alliance formation (Van Dyke and Soule 2002), can be combined with 
economic crises, political opportunities (Van Dyke and McCammon 
2010:xx), or responses to counter-coalitions and social movements 
(Isaac 2010:25). Although coalition-building involves rational 
calculation, social ties (Corrigall-Brown and Meyer 2010:5) are at the 
core. As Van Dyke and McCammon argue, common identities and 
ideologies are also important for coalition-building (Smith and 
Bandy 2005; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Lichterman 1996), as are 
common interests (xviii). The political culture could provide 
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incentives for mobilization (Diani, Lindsay, and Purdue 2010), as 
could common history and experience with political systems such as 
democracy or communism (Guenther 2010; Wiest 2010).  
Considering how coalitions are built, cooperation among 
actors to pursue a common goal can be forged “horizontally” with 
agents of similar power or “vertically” with more powerful agents, 
usually based in nation-states (Tarrow 2005:8), see also Stokke and 
Wiebelhaus-Brahm in this volume. Horizontal relationships are built 
through transnational coalitions “connecting common networks of 
actors from different countries with similar claims” (Tarrow 2005:32). 
Vertical relationships are built between local activists and external 
states and international organizations. They often create “boomerang 
effects” (Keck and Sikkink 1999) and “spirals” (Risse et al. 1999), 
through which governments are pressured to address problematic 
rights practices. Such models have also gained traction in analysis of 
diaspora politics (Wayland 2004; Brinkerhoff 2016).  
This article addresses the little-explored “horizontal” 
dimension of coalition-building among diaspora entrepreneurs, of 
“bottom-up approaches” to transitional justice, characterized by 
agents of relatively equal power. It builds on Sikkink’s “insider-
outsider” coalitions (2005:164-165), considering that actors of similar 
power could build coalitions in international and domestic contexts, 
relatively open and where the issue of interest (here genocide 
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recognition) is not resolved.  
Coalitions take different forms depending on duration and 
level of involvement. As Tarrow (2005) notes, they can be categorized 
as instrumental (short-term cooperation with low-level involvement); 
event (short-term cooperation with higher involvement); federated 
(low involvement of organizations, long-term cooperation) and 
campaign (high-level involvement, long-term cooperation). Regarding 
short-term coalitions, the lowest potential to sustain collective action 
comes from instrumental types, with event-based coalitions having 
more potential, responding to international events and depending on 
opportunities in the international environment (163-168). Durable 
coalitions are formed around single, yet long-term issues and require 
high-level involvement (Levi and Murphy 2006). 
Coalition-building has been discussed minimally as a causal 
mechanism in diaspora politics. Diasporas become engaged by local 
secessionist elites in a conflict spiral; transnational coalitions then 
build, endure, or dissipate depending on the organizational strength 
of strategic centers and diasporic institutions (Koinova 2011). In the 
global city, identity-based actors create more durable coalitions with 
other actors or less durable ones to address events in the developing 
world (Adamson and Koinova 2013). Godwin raises ideas about 
diasporas building global coalitions to address issues of political 
prisoners (2017). Coalition-building in these accounts has not delved 
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deeper into motivations, modes of engagement or durability. 
 
Methodology, data, and scope  
This article explores the context of diaspora mobilizations for 
genocide recognition. Case study methodology is used, suited to a 
theoretically underdeveloped field (George and Bennett 2004). The 
Armenian case was selected from conflict-generated diasporas, 
displaced by mass violence and atrocities or socialized with a 
traumatic history, and claiming genocide recognition. These findings 
are methodologically relevant to other cases of diasporas linked to 
postconflict polities, such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraqi Kurdistan, and 
Sri Lanka. The article also uses an implicit comparison with a 
“negative case” of the Anfal campaign in Iraq related to gross human 
rights violations against Kurds, to tease out conditions under which 
diaspora coalition-building is not very likely to occur. Empirical 
evidence is informed by data from a 5-year European Research 
Council study of conflict-generated diasporas, more than 40 semi-
structured interviews among Armenian and Kurdish diaspora 
entrepreneurs in Europe, and participant observation in London, 
Berlin, and Brussels (2009-2017).  
I limit the scope conditions, valid for conflict-generated 
diasporas in liberal states, not in authoritarian or other illiberal 
states, where host-land contexts might not be open for mobilization 
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or be outright repressive. I also consider what Ben Anderson (1998) 
calls “long-distance nationalist” diasporas, not those adjacent to 
territories where genocide has previously occurred. I seek to 
understand how coalitions are formed and how durable and 
organizationally strong they become, not with how ideas are formed 
or coalitions dissipate. The article also excludes involvement of kin-
states, particularly Armenia here. Genocide claims have not been 
central to independent Armenia since 1991, taking a backseat to 
foreign policy concerns to prevent escalating conflicts with long-term 
political rivals Turkey and Azerbaijan.  
 
Remembered and forgotten genocides and their diasporas 
Scholarship on the Armenian genocide developed 
substantially to document atrocities in 1915 during the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire (Panossian 1998; Tölölyan 2000; Balakian 2003, 
Hovannissian 2007). The Young Turk regime rounded up and 
eventually massacred or exposed to imminent death an estimated 
800,000 to 1.5 million Armenians in the Syrian desert (Panossian 
1998:84; Armenian National Institute 2015). The centennial was 
commemorated widely in 2015, recognized by the European 
Parliament and 23 countries, in addition to Pope Francis, Bishop of 
Rome (Mullen 2015). But the atrocities are still officially denied as 
“genocide” by Turkey, successor state of the Ottoman Empire.  
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The Armenian diaspora is estimated to be about 5 million 
globally, approximately more than those in Armenia proper, though 
reliable data are scarce (Statistics Armenia 2014). Although this 
diaspora is considered “classic” (Sheffer 2003:75-77), scattered across 
the Caucasus and Middle East at the turn of the twentieth century 
(Pattie 1999:3), the 1915 genocide is at the core of Armenian identity, 
a “lens through which Armenians experience the world around 
them” (Becker 2014:64).  
A sociospatial dynamic characterizes Armenian genocide 
recognition claims, predominantly spread in the diaspora in the 
Western countries and Middle East, from descendants of genocide 
survivors under Ottoman rule, but not in Russia, host-state to a large 
Armenian diaspora. The diaspora in Russia emerged especially after 
the end of communism primarily from territories of present-day 
Armenia [considered “eastern Armenia”], and is mostly 
economically driven (Galkina 2006:181). Survivors from former 
Ottoman territories  [“western Armenia”] fled in 1915 to Lebanon, 
Syria, Iran, Greece, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. The US, France, 
and other European countries became important for secondary 
migration, as refugees left because of the Lebanese civil war (1975–
1990) and the Iranian Revolution (1979). Other states, such as the UK, 
Netherlands, and Sweden, have accepted Armenians more recently. 
Armenian diaspora-based parties and apostolic churches in Western 
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countries and the Middle East continue to maintain memory of the 
genocide, including coordinating reactions to counter-mobilizations 
among the Turkish and Azeri diaspora.  
By contrast, the massacres committed by the collapsing 
Ottoman Empire against Assyrians, Pontus Greeks, and other 
Christian populations remain almost unknown. Lemarchand (2011:1) 
calls them “forgotten genocides,” little mobilized upon and 
overshadowed by the memory of others. The 1915 Armenian 
genocide overshadowed that against Assyrians (Khosroeva 
2007:267); the Holocaust dominated debates to the expense of Roma 
and Slavs in Europe; and attention to the 1990s Rwandan genocide 
has surpassed those in Burundi in Africa (ibid; Travis 2011:134).  
The Assyrians have roots in present Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria (McLure 2001), and ancient history in Mesopotamia (Roux 
1964). Similar to the Armenians, Assyrians were subjected to 
inhumane treatment by the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and in Iran, which the Ottomans attacked during 
the 1914 warfare. There are some estimates that 500,000-750,000 were 
killed, many during the “Death Marches” of starvation and 
dehydration (Khosroeva 2007). 
At present, Turkey denies the Assyrian genocide as it does the 
Armenian (Travis 2011). From this perspective, the Armenian 
diaspora contributes to “politicization” of a historical question; all it 
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supposedly does is to mobilize for genocide recognition.3 In contrast, 
while the European Parliament recognized it as genocide, 
acknowledgment remains limited among many of its nation-states.  
The visibility of genocide recognition claims among 
Armenians starkly contrasts with the minimal attention on 
Assyrians. There are several reasons for this anomaly. In Travis’s 
account, Assyrian genocide scholarship has been scarce, not least 
because until the early 2000s works focused the Armenian genocide 
and rarely mentioned atrocities committed to others. Discussions 
about Assyrians were criminalized in Turkey. Turkey and Iraq 
viewed Assyrians as rebellious populations, and sought to thwart 
their mobilizations. There are ongoing but little visible relations 
between Assyrians and Kurds due to a schism over the situation of 
Assyrians in Iraq in the Nineveh Plain, including with regard to the 
autonomous authorities in Iraqi Kurdistan. Developing a more 
coherent picture about Assyrians has also been difficult, because they 
are further called Chaldeans, Syriacs, Arameans, Kurdish Christians, 
and others (Travis 2011:123-128). Some have cooperation issues with 
each other, most notably among Assyrians and Syrians, eventually 
impacting the Armenian relationship.  
By contrast to the Armenians, with a rather stable if not 
entirely monolithic identity, that of Assyrians is fragmented and 
complicated without a language or religion to relate to. Some 
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contested boundaries were eventually established to include 
Christians speaking a neo-Aramaic language or dialect (McLure 
2001:109-110). Assyrians are concentrated in the Middle East, with 
significant numbers in the diaspora in Sweden (120,000, Radio 
Sweden 2015), Germany (100,000, Borkener Zeitung 2011), US (82,355, 
US Census 2000), Australia (around 80,000, Assyria 2017), Russia, 
and other countries. Assyrians migrated from the region in the 1910s 
and later during the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Gulf War (1990-
1991), and during repression and warfare in Iraq, including because 
of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS). Nevertheless, Assyrians 
are much fewer in the Middle East and abroad, and their 
mobilizations remain little visible. There are a few exceptions, such 
as activism to support the Yezidi population, displaced through the 
war with ISIS in Iraq (Radio Sweden 2015). Yet, as a minority 
without a state or regional autonomy in the Middle East, and living 
in Christian-dominated environments in Western countries, 
Assyrians have faced stronger assimilation pressures than 
Armenians (McLure 2000; Khosroeva 2007; Travis 2011). 
This article analyzes Armenian-Assyrian diaspora coalitions 
for genocide recognition, but also those between Armenians and 
Kurds. In Lemarchand’s (2011) and Hardi’s accounts (2011), the 
chemical attacks by Saddam Hussein against the Kurds of Iraq at the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) is a “forgotten” genocide. As 
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Hardi argues, it is considered “a Kurdish Hiroshima” and likened 
“to what the Warsaw ghetto meant to Jews, Guernica to the Basques, 
and Wounded Knee to the Sioux” (109). Saddam Hussein’s Anfal 
campaign consisted of eight consecutive offenses in six geographical 
areas where Kurds lived. With no exact figures, estimates show 
around 2,600 villages destroyed, and 50,000-100,000 civilians in mass 
graves (107, 113). Recognition of the Anfal is high on the agenda of 
the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. Recognitions were 
achieved also by the Iraqi National Assembly in 2008, the High 
Criminal Court in 2010, and UK, Norway, and Sweden in 2012-2013 
(Baser and Toivanen, 2017:405-415). 
Anfal is not the only grievance Kurds maintain in their long 
struggle for self-determination. Similarly to Assyrians, Kurds are 
stateless people inhabiting territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. 
Yet Kurds have much more mobilized on self-determination, of 
which international recognition of genocide has been an important 
part. The Treaty of Sèvres (1920) briefly raised hopes for statehood, 
but actual self-determination “remained a distant objective” (Hardi 
2011:111). Iraqi Kurds gained official autonomy, and are currently 
governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government within Iraq, with 
recurrent calls for independence, including a 2017 referendum. 
Moreover, Kurdish mobilizations have been tackled with repression 
and criminalization in Turkey. The Kurdistan People’s Party (PKK) 
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of Abdulah Öcalan has been put on a terrorist list. The alleged peace 
process between Turkey’s government and Kurdish leadership has 
been failing amid continuing violence against the Kurds (Tas 2017). 
The conflict has escalated, especially after the attempted 2016 coup 
against President Recep Erdoğan in Turkey. Furthermore, since 2012, 
Kurdish resistance has developed a de facto autonomous region 
within Syria, widely known as Rojava, advancing a political project 
of democratic autonomy and critiquing patriarchy and the nation-state 
as a whole (Ku ̈çük and Özselçuk 2016:185-186). 
Many mobilizations became magnified beyond the original 
territories through the large Kurdish diaspora, estimated at more 
than 1.1 million outside the Middle East, with significant presence in 
Western Europe, most notably Germany, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, and Sweden, and more limited in the 
US (Kurdish Project 2018). The diaspora has been dispersed from 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran by violence and repression in the twentieth 
century. They also migrated from Turkey to Western Europe due to 
guest-worker programs during the 1960s and 1970s, and more 
recently from Syria due to continuing warfare since 2012. Despite 
internal divisions, the Kurdish diaspora is highly mobilized in 
Western Europe, and a powerful nonstate actor supporting claims for 
autonomy and independence in the Middle East (Vohra 2017).  
The following section unpacks the coalition-building efforts 
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among diasporas to recognize their genocides. Even if all three 
groups targeted Turkey after the 2005 opening of negotiations for EU 
accession, they acted not as a large coordinated coalition, but as two 
coalitions of which the Armenian diaspora was central, even if 
differentially engaged (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Coalition-building between Armenians, Assyrians, and Kurds 
 
 
 
 
Legend: 
 
Link 1: Armenians and Assyrians in coalition:  
Long-term cooperation and high level of involvement:  
Common victimhood experience, social ties, religion, shared common enemy;  
Armenians as the leading partner. 
 
Link 2: Armenians and Kurds in coalition:  
Long-term cooperation, low level of involvement 
Adversarial historical experience, no common religion or history, but shared common enemy; 
Kurds as the leading partner. 
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Coalition-building among diaspora Armenians and 
Assyrians 
Armenians and Assyrians have been in long-standing 
relationships in the Middle East. Joint diaspora efforts for genocide 
recognition developed more recently. Individuals and organizations 
acted on political opportunities associated with campaigns to 
recognize the Armenian genocide, and social ties of religious identity 
and genocidal experience. Their coalition-building is durable and 
could be considered alongside Tarrow’s ideas about coalitions with 
long-term cooperation and high organizational involvement. 
 Armenians and Assyrians shared conflict and cooperation as 
neighbors for nearly 3,000 years. Al-Jeloo (2010) argues that before 
the invention of the Armenian alphabet, religious texts were written 
in Aramaic or Greek. Later, the Armenian Patriarch represented 
Assyrians in the Constantinople court. Armenians and Assyrians 
inhabited territories of present Turkey and Iran, where some 
Assyrians assimilated into the Armenian way of life. Living side by 
side, they fell to the same genocide policies as the Armenians. The 
suffering created common bonds.  
 Armenian and Assyrian coalition-building for genocide 
recognition has grown in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
As Travis points out, this is also the time Armenian historiography 
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started more explicitly mentioning the Assyrian genocide (2011). 
Also, a 2007 resolution of the International Association of Genocide 
Scholars proclaimed that “the Ottoman campaign against Christian 
minorities between 1914 and 1923 constituted a genocide against 
Armenians, Assyrians, Pontian and Anatolian Greeks.” It also asked 
Turkey to recognize the genocide, issue a formal apology, and “take 
prompt and meaningful steps towards restitution.” Khosraeva (2007) 
summarizes a common interest-based rationale to join forces: “A 
more complete picture of the Turkish massacres of other ethno-
religious groups will further augment the powerful evidence 
contradicting Turkish denial of the genocide” (267). The implications 
are that for more success in genocide recognition, political mobilizers 
need to reach outside their comfort zone and raise awareness about 
suffering of other Christian peoples. 
 This rationale becomes visible in a discussion with a former 
politician in Sweden, involved in developing cross-party 
parliamentary work to recognize the Armenian genocide in 2010. 
Sweden’s context was highly conducive for recognition claims, with 
its explicit political culture emphasizing human rights and dignity, 
and open policies supporting refugees from conflict zones. This 
empowerment of diaspora entrepreneurs becomes even more visible 
considering that at the time Armenia did not even have an embassy 
in Sweden. An initial motion for recognition passed in parliament in 
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1999, but wording regarding “genocide” needed retraction due to 
strong Turkish opposition. Following these events, the politician 
argues that was approached by representatives of Assyrian 
organizations. They advocated that this genocide concerned not only 
Armenians, but other Christian people in the Ottoman Empire 
(author’s interview 2013). Thus, even with historically strong social 
ties between communities based on common Christian identity and 
traumatic experience, the initial motion for collaboration for 
genocide recognition came from Assyrians at a particularly 
opportune time, a result of counter-mobilization from Turkey. 
  As the politician continues, the coalition was formed around 
2001-2002, when Armenian and Assyrian groups began working 
together to inform MPs and the wider public. Newspaper articles 
were published. Demonstrations were launched on the day of the 
Armenian genocide, 24 April, and among Assyrian people in 
Sodertalje near Stockholm, where many Assyrians and Syrians live. 
Such demonstrations coupled with exhibitions were held every year 
until 2010, when the motion successfully passed the parliament 
(2013). Even if the government did not align with this parliamentary 
decision (Horizon Weekly 2015), the 2010 recognition played an 
important symbolic role, as it recognized the mass killings of 
Assyrians and Pontus Greeks alongside Armenians as “genocide” 
(AINA News 2010). The campaign for Armenian genocide 
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recognition around the 2015 centennial also succeeded in other 
countries and important international institutions where Armenian 
and Assyrian populations live. In April 2015, the Dutch parliament 
passed a binding resolution recognizing the genocide of Armenians, 
Assyrians, and Greeks. Makris argues: “Assyrians have worked with 
Greeks and Armenians to pressure Turkey to recognize the genocide 
of World War One” (11/04/2015). The European Parliament passed 
a motion to label the mass killings “genocide,” considering Assyrians 
and Greeks besides Armenians. In 2016 the German Bundestag, by 
an overwhelming majority, passed a “symbolic and long overdue 
resolution,” recognizing the 1915 killings as genocide, mentioning 
also Assyrians, Syriacs, Chaldeans, and Aramaic-speaking Christians 
(Abraham 2016). 
 The 2015 genocide recognitions, a seeming blitz-campaign, 
were long in preparation, with Assyrian and Greek pressure groups 
band-wagoning behind the more mobilized Armenians. Hence, even 
if this coalition-building involved diaspora group as peers in 
“horizontal” relationships, a somewhat asymmetric power dynamic 
could be discerned: diaspora Assyrians behind the better mobilized 
and more powerful Armenians.  
 
Coalition-building among diaspora Armenians and Kurds 
Whereas Armenian, Assyrian, and other diasporas pressured 
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Turkey on a problematic past, coalition-building between Armenians 
and Kurds has been more future-oriented. Negotiations in 2005 for 
EU accession made improvement of Turkey’s human rights record 
imperative. Following the 1993 Copenhagen criteria requiring 
dignified civic and political treatment of minorities (Kanli 2016), 
Kurds and Armenians received an impetus to mobilize. A narrative 
of human rights violations became the basis for seeking political 
change. By contrast to the Armenian and Assyrian coalition-building, 
based primarily among diasporas in host-lands, these coalitions 
spanned Kurds and Armenian networks within Turkey, their 
diasporas in different countries, especially Europe, and marginally 
Armenia. Thus, analyzing diaspora coalition-building requires 
attention beyond simply host-states and home-states, but to consider 
transnational social field dynamics.  
 Armenians developed diaspora long-term coalitions with 
Kurds to pressure Turkey to democratize, but cautiously with little 
organizational involvement. At 2015 Armenian commemorations in 
Berlin, Kurdish organizations distributed leaflets and encouraged 
joint events. At gatherings such as a 2017 European Parliament 
session, leaders spoke of Armenian suffering during the genocide, 
linking past human rights atrocities to those toward Kurds at 
present, and advocated preventing future human rights abuses in 
Turkey (participant observation 2017).  
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Kurdish organizations took the lead in eagerness and 
initiative. Why is this so? In a 2013 conversation, an Armenian 
diaspora interviewee argued about the difficulty forgetting that 
Kurds participated in the genocide alongside Ottoman Turks, even 
after influential Kurdish leaders, organizations, and newspapers 
expressed apology. As Geerdink (2015) argues, during the 1990s 
warfare between the Turkish state and the Kurdish PKK, when 
thousands of civilians were killed, elderly Kurds started sharing with 
children and grandchildren their memories of the Armenian 
genocide. As Kurdish politician Abdullah Demirbas put it, fighting 
for Kurdish rights and national identity helped Kurds come to terms 
with their role in the Armenian genocide. Many felt ashamed, but 
others argued their ancestors were used by the state. Demirbas was 
quoted: “they should have resisted. Our silence makes us guilty” 
(Geerdink 2015). Once loyalists to the Ottoman Empire, Kurds 
started understanding that they “became the new enemies of the 
republic,” turning from perpetrators into victims (Ayata 2015:809). 
Acknowledgment of Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide 
mounted in the late 1990s, reaching a new level related to Turkey’s 
EU accession.  
The link between Armenian genocide and Kurdish diaspora 
activism for autonomy and democratization has been dominated by 
political dynamics related to Turkey. The liberalization of Turkey 
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opened space to ideas in the small Armenian minority, primarily in 
Istanbul. Armenians in Turkey are estimated at 50,000-70,000, with 
continuing assimilation and emigration. Most notable was Turkish-
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. Melkonyan argues that in his Akos 
newspaper Dink sought to bring Armenian questions to the Turkish 
public, including peace-building and genocide. His views did not 
initially coincide with mainstream or diaspora Armenian views, but 
his 2007 assassination by a Turkish nationalist made him an 
Armenian hero, a new victim of genocide (2013). During 2009 
conversations with Armenian diaspora activists in London, Dink’s 
assassination was considered highly important for the small diaspora 
segment interested in prioritizing civil society in Turkey, rather than 
genocide recognition. The connection with the Kurdish issue became 
most potent, as joining forces for advancing democracy in Turkey 
concerned all minorities, including the numerous and better 
mobilized Kurds. Dink’s funeral, including some Armenian diaspora 
representatives, turned into a demonstration, where people chanted: 
“We are all Armenians, we are all Hrant Dink,” in Turkish, 
Armenian, and Kurdish (Eliot 2007).  
Armenian issues, including related to genocide, became 
important for political activities of the left-wing Turkish People’s 
Democratic Party (HDP), advocating democracy, women’s and 
minority rights. The party has a strong Kurdish presence, and is in 
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alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Regions Party. Ethnic 
Armenian HDP Member of Parliament Garo Paylan spoke on 
genocide issues, and became quite visible in 2016, when physically 
attacked by other parliament members (Armenian Quarterly 2016). 
Paylan called on the Armenian diaspora to consider that the 
“Armenian genocide took place here [in Turkey] and coming to 
terms with the genocide should also take place here” (Janbazian 
2015). The HDP, with its diaspora branches, also considers the 
Armenian issue important for pressuring Turkey, and seeks 
collaborative relationships (author’s interview, 2017).  
While coalition-building became more institutionalized in 
Turkey, especially through the HDP, diaspora relationships between 
Armenians and Kurds remained long-term, yet less organizationally 
involved abroad. One reason is that Kurdish autonomy in Turkey is 
a major interest among Kurds, liberal and leftist groups in Turkey. 
These groups chastise Turkey’s leadership for not recognizing the 
Armenian genocide, but stop short of further supporting genocide 
recognition once its consequences come up, namely potential 
reparations and self-determination related to “Kurdistan” vs. 
“Western Armenia.” Such attitudes have played an important role 
for disallowing closer ties between Armenians and Kurds to form.4 
Another reason for such lukewarm coalition-building is the 
almost exclusive Armenian diaspora interest in genocide recognition, 
                                                        
4 I thank a reviewer for this comment. 
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with somewhat diverging interests from dynamics in Armenia as a 
kin-state, and from Armenians and Kurds in Turkey interested 
primarily in peace and civil society. A statement in a pro-democracy 
conference in 2017 at the European Parliament sums up: on an 
audience question whether the Kurdish and powerful Armenian 
diasporas could campaign to free political prisoners in Turkey, a 
delegate responded that they were talking with Kurds and Alevites, 
but “no Armenian came to me,” despite a large Armenian diaspora, 
which “I have not seen unfortunately” (author participant 
observation, June 2017). 
No strong coalition formed between Armenians and Kurds 
who sought to internationalize Saddam’s Anfal campaign. Anfal-
related activism has spread in representations of the Iraqi Kurdistan 
Regional Government, especially in Europe (Baser and Toivanen 
2017). This does not suggest that there were no sympathies between 
specific Armenian and Kurdish activists and NGOs, but that a full-
fledged campaign was not formed. In methodological terms, the 
pursuit of the Anfal campaign on its own terms rather than in a 
coalition serves as a “negative” case to tease out nonconducive 
conditions for  diaspora coalitions for genocide recognition with 
other groups.  
There are several reasons the Anfal recognition remained 
largely marginal to political dynamics. An Iraqi Kurdish official 
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confirmed that connections with the Armenian diaspora on the Anfal 
recognition have been minimal (author’s conversation, 2017). I argue 
that aversion to coalitions is based on lack of alignment of 
contemporary interests. First, the Anfal has been related to Iraqi 
Kurdistan, not Turkey, a common adversary also for Armenians. 
Second, Iraqi Kurds sought to claim the Anfal as an international 
crime against humanity after it was recognized domestically in Iraq, 
more clearly connecting genocide recognition claims and self-
determination (Baser and Toivanen 2017:407-415). For Armenians, 
self-determination has not been a priority outside Armenia proper 
after the collapse of communism and the 1991-1994 war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, which left the de facto state of Nagorno-
Karabakh in a “frozen” conflict. This is despite the Armenian 
diaspora considering Nagorno-Karabakh (“Artsakh”) the “cradle of 
Armenianness,” and significaly mobilizing about it in the 1990s. 
Third, Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran have different national 
goals. Many contemporary concerns, most notably ISIS fighting in 
Iraq, have drawn diaspora attention, as did the 2017 independence 
referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. As Levi and Murphy (2006) argue, a 
durable coalition with long-term involvement requires a single 
political issue. In Armenian-Kurdish relations, Turkey as common 
adversary has been of interest for durable collaborations, but 
multiple political issues among Kurdish groups, alongside 
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differences in religion and history between them, have prevented 
coalitions with high institutional involvement. 
 
Conclusions 
This article explored why and how diasporas join to pursue 
genocide recognition claims, and how durable and organized such 
coalitions could become. I argue that diaspora coalitions require a 
common adversary; a context enabling proliferation of human rights 
claims; and a single issue to focus globally scattered diaspora 
entrepreneurs. Value-based claims give legitimacy beyond particular 
diasporas; yet coalitions’ durability and organizational involvement 
depend on contemporary strategic and tactical calculations.  
I offer empirical evidence based on multisited research in 
Europe. The 2005 opportunity to pressure Turkey on its EU accession 
provided an incentive for Armenians, Assyrians, Pontus Greeks, and 
Kurds to join against a common adversary on an issue of long-term 
importance. The Armenian diaspora played a central if not always 
leading role. A durable coalition with high-level involvement 
emerged between Armenians, Assyrians, and Pontus Greeks, who 
share traumatic experiences and religion and seek to redress a 
violent past. A long-term coalition with low-level involvement 
emerged between Armenians and Kurds, joining ranks in loose, ad 
hoc ways.   
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This article shows the need to study diaspora activism beyond 
established “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and “spiral” 
(Risse et al. 1999) models in political science. Coalition-building 
among diasporas for genocide recognition does not reflect these 
models. In their original version, such models feature human rights 
activists in a liberalizing or repressive state, seeking “vertical” 
relationships with states and international organizations to pressure 
home governments to improve their human rights practices. In our 
cases, coalitions formed “horizontally” on the basis of forging 
relations among actors with largely similar power. Yet, even if 
considered of “equal” power, these diasporas are in an asymmetrical 
relationship among each other: the Armenian diaspora is sought after 
by both Assyrians and Kurds but much more likely to build durable 
coalitions with Assyrians. The Armenian diaspora took a backseat 
regarding coalition-building with Kurds, not least because of mixed 
feelings related to Kurdish participation in the 1915 genocide and 
issues of possible future reparations and territory. Also, the civil 
society dynamics of Turkey, dominated by the Kurdish question and 
activism, has not been central to large segments of the Armenian 
diaspora, focused primarily on genocide recognition. 
The uneven ways diaspora coalitions are formed in different 
contexts show that sociospatial dynamics in diaspora politics are not 
necessarily coterminous with a triadic nexus model incorporating 
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host-states, home-states, and diasporas only. Claims about genocide 
recognition could have political purchase only in parts of 
transnational social fields, like the Armenian diaspora in Western 
countries and Middle East, and of little interest elsewhere, as in 
Russia. Diasporas are not simply linked to Armenia as a kin-state, 
important for Armenian genocide recognition, but largely marginal 
to diaspora coalition-building dynamics. Important is another state, 
Turkey, successor of the state that perpetrated the genocide. 
Moreover, coalitions occur predominantly in host-land contexts for 
groups, such as Armenians and Assyrians, or in homeland contexts 
that span abroad, as for Armenians and Kurds.  
This article speaks further to the broader “diasporas and 
transitional justice” agenda advanced by this special issue. It 
provides a clear instance of coalition-building with long-term effects, 
as genocide recognition is incredibly difficult to achieve. Such 
coalition-building has been more successful among agents with 
common identities and common victim-based past, leading to some 
successful genocide recognitions in Western countries and 
international institutions, especially around the 2015 Armenian 
genocide centennial. Coalitions without common identities and 
victim-based past, spanning countries of origin and settlement, are 
less successful, even with an opportune process, such as Turkey’s EU 
accession. Dissipation of such diaspora coalitions is more likely to 
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occur after the 2016 attempted coup in Turkey. 
Coalition-building is only one form of diaspora groups 
seeking to build awareness with other groups about human rights 
violations and genocides as a “never again” experience. The Jewish 
diaspora, because of the Holocaust, has been looked to in this respect 
and sought by other diasporas. Bosnians, Palestinians, Rwandans, 
and Tamils have made such humanistic claims in solidarity with 
others. In 2016-2018 such solidarity was shown in diaspora circles in 
response to the chemical gas attacks against civilians in the war in 
Syria and ethnic cleansing of Rohingya in Myanmar. Yet such claims 
remain limited to discursive action, engaged in loose networks, or 
voiced in academic venues. This article shows that to join and sustain 
coalitions, diaspora groups need common unifying targets, 
conducive liberal contexts for human rights claims, and a single issue 
as focal point for mobilization.  
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i Article II of the UN Convention (1948) defines genocide as “any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
to members of the group;  (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.” 
